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The level and scope of European Union (EU) integration activities are show-
ing the aspects of civilizational development with a huge impact on the world 
system of civilizations and make more evident the fact that the future of EU 
depends on the attitude of European policy-makers to the national, cultural, 
and political identities. Interest in the identities has been reinforced in recent 
years by the failure of EU Constitutional Treaty and further attempts to reach 
an agreament about the new Treaty. This failure stimulated cogitations on both 
the subject of Constitutional Treaty and the features of the European demos. 
Spirited discussions pointed to the so called “deficits” – “community deficit”, 
“legitimacy deficit” and, as a consequence, to the “democracy deficit”. Thus EU 
future can be seen as depending on the removal of these “deficits”. How can this 
be done under the prevailing political attitude of denationalization? The prob-
lem of European demos was aggravated by the enlargement of EU: new Member 
states are loaded with different historic experience and clearly visible features 
of national sense. National feelings have been the main force raising people for 
national liberation movement or national revival. This experience must be taken 
into account while discussing new political guidelines for the construction of 
European demos. The social content of demos, including identity, common his-
tory and the sense of “unity in diversity”, could be accumulated through the 
loyalties and bonds of affection to one‘s nation, culture, language, and historical 
myths; thus, the attitude of denationalization requires a modification. 
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1
At present it is becoming increasingly apparent that the future of the EU, as a civiliza-
tional construct, of the cohesion of this construct with the world transforming power 
and the concrete shape of the “unity in diversity” depends on the prevailing attitude of 
European politics towards national, cultural and political identities, as well as on the 
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established guidelines of European policy in regard to these identities. The subject-
matter of identities and the nationalism associated with them has “come back” into the 
spotlight of the researchers and has stimulated a wide variety of new investigations. 
This wave of investigations is closely connected with another wave – the researches of 
social, collective and cultural memory. Currently these waves of investigations have 
been intensifying each other. Why is it so? Because it is the social, collective and cul-
tural memory that sustains and forms national, social, and cultural identities. Other 
important question attracting ever widening interest of researchers is that the forms of 
collective memory are needed for the construction and implementation of the features 
of European identity, however weak it may be, or disseminating and making operative 
at the national level the “Idea of Europe”.
When speaking about identities we presuppose the subjects of these identities. 
The subject of political identity of solitary states is quite obvious, it being the socie-
ties of those states that bear peculiarities of national identity. The citizens are at the 
same time the countrymen, since they belong to the traditional ethnic, religious ethnic 
and cultural ethnic communities. Thus, it is possible to claim that political identity 
is closely linked with other identities which are characterized by ethno-cultural fea-
tures. According to Michael Bruter, political identities are comprised of two distinct 
but interacting dimensions, civic and cultural which both are tied to political sym-
bols (Bruter 2005). Naturally, the question arises: what is the subject of EU‘s political 
identity? Drawing a parallel, we should consider this subject to be “EU society” or 
“EU civic society”, i.e. demos. We also hear speaking about the “European nation” 
perspectives. Does such a society virtually exist? Are we observing a more vivid fea-
tures of it? Relying on the results of Eurobarometer polls, which show that only some 
3 percent of EU residents consider themselves pure Europeans, with 7 percent claim-
ing that their Europeanness is more important than their national identity, Richard 
Bellami draws a reasonable conclusion that: “there is little in the way of a pan-Euro-
pean demos” and “EU identity is week” (Bellami 2006: 183). EU cannot strengthen 
its existence without relevant public space or without definite democratic procedures 
of the elections of the representational governmental bodies. Bearing in mind the defi-
cits of legitimacy, communality and constitutionality typical of EU which are being 
widely discussed by researchers and politicians, it may be admitted that at best only 
parts of foundations for EU demos creation are being laid at the moment.
The problem of EU demos has come up while discussing the reasons and factors 
of the failure of EU Constitutional Treaty. After the “No” vote the wave of proclama-
tions from politics and analysts that the entire process of European integration and the 
functioning of EU were in crisis rose up. The researchers pointed that “The nature 
of the supposed crisis ranged from “existential” to “political”, to “profound”; it was 
a crisis of “confidence” and of “identity” that called into question the future of EU” 
(Dinani 2006: 63). Of course, in these statements we can see some exaggeration due 
to the first moment disappointment; nevertheless, the failure of the EU Constitutional 
Treaty and its impact on the future of the EU have encouraged the researchers of 
different spheres more thoroughly to analyze the inner contradictions of the EU 
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development and governance. The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty has been 
recognized as the turning point in the EU development, setting up new conditions of 
the EU existence.
The rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty (for details see Heinsworth 2006) has 
shown that the EU failed to supplant the inherent inconsistency, which was becoming 
increasingly sharp, with the euro-integration overstepping the sphere of economics 
and embracing social and cultural spheres. This inconsistency has resulted from the 
dual origin of the EU since the political power stems from both the agreements of 
national states and from supranational power center, which functions under a “deficit” 
of democratic legitimacy. Consequently, it is reasonably claimed that “The Union‘s 
legitimacy problems lie in a lack of basic and uncontested “vertical consolidation” of 
constitutional order” (Puntscher Rickman 2007: 134). However, this consolidation is 
directed not only to the problems of governance, but also to those of creating a society 
being governed. So far, it has not yet been decided what governs what. Whether it is 
the agreements of states that govern the EU or is it the later that governs the member 
states. 
There is another layer of legitimacy problems stemming from the Interinstitutional 
Agreements that have been concluded between the main governmental bodies of the 
EU, namely The Council of the European Union, the Commission, and the European 
Parliament. According to Daniela Kietz and Andreas Maurer, despite the fact that 
these Agreements “are an established part of the mass of informal and formal rules 
structuring EU decision-making and interinstitutional relations, there is as yet no 
common understanding of their role and functions in the institutional and legal sys-
tem of the EU – neither in political science nor legal studies” (Kietz, Maurer 2007: 
20–21). Accordingly we can draw a conclusion that this sort of problems avoids the 
attention of general public.
The EU legitimacy problem is closely connected with the EU demos problem. 
Andrew Gamble draws our attention to the fact that two attitudes to the EU legitima-
cy prevailed and stood out on the EU political level, with one part deriving legitimacy 
from the agreements signed by the states, whereas the other part deriving it from the 
universal democratic principles and common citizenship. The implementation of the 
latter issues is the matter of the supranational political power center. Consequently, 
the power center promoting the development of the EU is entirely separated from the 
level of national countries. The Constitutional Treaty has tempted to combine these 
different attitudes; however, the inconsistency which appeared to be fatal has not been 
eliminated. As a result, the Treaty has not satisfied either of these attitudes bearing po-
litical layers (Gamble 2006: 35). Another important fact is that, according to Gamble, 
it was not quite obvious who is the subject raising the Constitution and ratifying it. In 
other words, on the part of the subject no statement like “We the people of Europe” 
has been made. Unfortunately, such statement could not have been made anyway, 
since it was unacceptable for many countries, which still have no clear vision of the 
EU state model and are trying to maintain the powers of their national countries.
The lack of the European communality is strongly emphasized by Amitai Etzioni, 
who deals with the problems of the EU development and the EU future prospects. 
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In his opinion, the rejection of the Treaty shows that it is the question of the demo-
cratic governing of EU that comes first. How could really democratic EU governance 
be established? It could be implemented only by creating the subject that could be 
able democratically set up governmental institutions and entrust them to govern itself. 
According to Etzioni, the EU‘s “democratization requires a significantly higher level 
of community than the EU now commands or ever commanded even before recent 
enlargement” (Etzioni 2007: 31). How could such a normative-effective community 
characterized by the core of moral culture be built? Can it be created as an entirely 
new society, dissociated from the still existing national and other societies with, let’s 
say, “strong identity? This is the question which arises particularly because of the at-
titude of EU political layer against any kinds of “strong” identities that could become 
a source of nationalism. This disposition is enhanced by a rather wide-spread ideol-
ogy of the “post-national” identity, supported by the political EU layer, which derives 
the political power from the universal democratic principles and civic values. From 
the point of view of the “post national” identity, political power is based on a pure 
civic community, dissociated from any essentialities, origins and histories as well as 
from culture, since it is the culture that upholds these matters. This suggests that the 
EU does not need any more common culture, and hence, any cultural identity, since 
common moral and civic values are quite enough. In this respect, the question how 
political values could be transformed into common values and how to make people 
undertake them is totally evaded. This problem, by the way, is typical of all theories, 
bearing utopian features.
However, is it worth and reasonable to deepen the discrepancy between national 
feelings and matters and the European civic values, which strengthens the arguments 
of Euro-skeptics? Etzioni maintains that “there is no need to abolish loyalties and 
bonds of affections to onè s nation, as long as on selected matters the loyalty to the 
new, encompassing community, trumps that of loyalty to one‘s nation” (Etzioni 2007: 
34). What encourages people to unite in view of the new and changed attitudes to the 
phenomena of social reality? People’s attention has always been drawn by moral con-
cerns that usually have the power to unite. Therefore, it is obligatory to speak about 
them. Political processes should stimulate the search for common values, hence, for 
social cohesion, causing the sense of new communality, without which the EU demos 
is unimaginable. To eliminate “the deficit of community” it is necessary to encour-
age the consideration of the transnational values and the rights connected with them. 
Consequently, the democratization is possible only through building a community, 
which needs the sphere of transnational communication, particular ways and means 
of interaction.
While raising the question what the subject of the European political identity is, 
we should also discuss the content of the collective memory of the subject, since 
this content must sustain its political identity. The creators of the European politi-
cal identity are facing the task to simultaneously “construct” European society and 
its memory, which requires certain common narratives. Taking into consideration 
the circumstances of the formation of national identities in the Modern times and the 
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development of those identities in the XX century, it is worth considering, what could 
be the basic discursive elements that reveal the idea of European identity and help 
unite the EU society, demos.
2
We are inclined to believe that many of the problems concerning the EU development, 
the rejection of EU Constitutional Treaty and other important matters connected with 
the development of EU after the acceptance of Lisbon Reform Treaty are and will be 
in one way or another linked with the attitude of political denationalization which 
prevails at the European political layer. Jiři Přibáň, who has analyzed the EU develop-
ment and its peculiarities, expresses his opinion concerning the EU political attitude 
in the following way: “The European Union has been symbolically constructed as a 
civil alternative to the ethnically burdened nation states” (Přibáň 2005: 139). The de-
nationalization attitude supports the model of the EU governance. The EU governance 
is inculcating the notion of the Network Europe, envisaging Europe as the community 
of citizens only who communicate on the basis of common rules in the environment 
of common institutions. The people join the associations or communities whose inter-
action makes up the nets. These nets involve sport clubs, cultural, educational institu-
tions and business spheres as well as political, financial and legal communities. The 
main objective of the European politics is to promote the development of such nets, 
reinforce them and coordinate their work (Leonard 1999). The model of the Network 
Europe is associated with the policy of weakening the power of nation states. Some 
part of state powers is transferred to the regions, thus promoting the direct regional 
links as well as the direct cooperation between the regions and Brussels. How and 
why has such an attitude of denationalization been established? 
After the World War II the fathers of European unification set the objective to 
create Europe free from any preconditions for new wars, let alone for the people’s 
slaughter. The main organizer of various atrocities was obvious – it was the German 
fascism and nationalism. Since other countries had invoked nationalism for their own 
purposes as well; nationalism was conceived as the basic phenomenon that must be 
erased. Nationalism became the Other in respect of which the vision of new Europe 
and European policy of development was established. In post-war German the political 
construction of national identity was provided to reach the determinate goal: “the past 
is excluded from any sense of ‘us“‘ (Müller-Härlin 2003: 276). The common political 
agreement was entrenched that the future of the new Europe entirely depends on the 
establishment of the attitude of denationalization. What is the source of nationalism? 
It actually springs from national feelings or at least from those that are considered 
to be national, which are supported by the national states, their policy, their cultural 
and political symbols and historical narratives. Thus, the environment of the suspicion 
for the manifestation of nationalism or alleged nationalism developed a habit to as-
sociate with nationalism all kinds of national feelings, manifestations of nationality, 
as well as all sorts of considerations of national questions. It is worth to notice that 
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according to Frantz C. Mayer and Jan Palmowski, who are leaning upon Federico 
Mancini and Joseph H. H. Weiler, though initial steps in making new Europe were 
considering as efforts to establish “European entity of constitutional nature”, yet soon 
“European integration become dissociated from any reference to the vocabulary linked 
to the nation-state: there are no European laws but regulations and directives; there is 
no government, but a commission; the whole construct was coined a Community, later 
a Union, but not a state” (Mayer, Palmowski 2004: 583). We can see that the develop-
ment of the EU after Reform Treaty will acquire more features of state construction.
The political attitude of denationalization was analyzed and developed in their own 
way by the thinkers of deconstructive trend who put forward the principle of “un-
conditional hospitality to the Other”, which has to become the basic landmark of the 
Euro-integration policy, as well as the followers of Giorgio Agamben, urging to create 
a-territorial “Europe of strangers” (Agamben 2000: 23–24). In this respect the con-
siderations of Jürgen Habermas are of particular significance, while he associates the 
future of Europe with the development of “constitutional patriotism”. Unfortunately, 
we do not have the possibility to discuss these trends of political thought in detail. 
However, we will throw some light on several important aspects revealed in Jacques 
Derrida and Habermas considerations.
The assumption made by Derrida is that the old Europe has already exhausted all 
the possibilities of self-identificational discourses; therefore, the intellectuals should 
be committed to guard the idea of Europe and the underlying possibility to create a 
different Europe, which is not confined to its identity, but is moving towards the po-
sition it has not reached yet (Derrida 1992: 29). The main obligation of Europe is to 
meet strangers with hospitality and kind-heartedness, not only integrating them but 
also accepting their difference.
Habermas envisages the future of Europe as a supranational formation, stretch-
ing far beyond the system of a federal country which should be based on the EU 
Constitution and the civic European identity stemming from it together with 
“European constitutional patriotism”. The backbone of the civic European identity 
should be created not out of certain common identities or European essence, but rath-
er out of the painful learning experience of European communities and its results. An 
important role is played by the historical experience of the old European countries, 
especially Germany. However, this learning experience was very different. For ex-
ample, Germany has learnt some things, whereas the societies which went through 
its aggression have learnt quite different things. The societies which started develop-
ing Western democracy sustained the results of World War II quite differently from 
the modern post-communist countries. Habermas suggests, however, that the new EU 
members are not too much concerned about learning or its results: they simply do 
not seem to be willing to share the sovereignty with Brussels. This reluctance has no 
reasonable background. Actually, it was the post-communist elites that unanimously 
rushed to share the sovereignty of their countries with Brussels, since after the fall 
of the Berlin wall such sharing helped them to keep their political and economical 
power most effectively. Speaking about the arguments in favor of the EU Constitution 
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Habermas suggests replacing the notion of ethnic nation by the concept of a civic na-
tion (Habermas 2001). The identity of the civic nation suppressing the oneness of the 
ethnicity as well as the threat of nationalism emerges from the common processes of 
European democratic development. According to this conception, the key issue is the 
democratic public spirit that defines and embeds the abstract and legally mediated 
solidarity of the strangers in the EU space. Naturally, such abstract solidarity should 
acquire a more concrete content, but where should we look for it? Moreover, this soli-
darity should dissociate itself from the national cultures. In other words, this solidar-
ity which, in its turn, has been strengthening the civic identity must create an entirely 
new content. From Habermas considerations we may assume that this new content 
might be filled with the common fate of all the European citizens. Nevertheless, so 
far such common fate is a total abstraction for most Europeans, since it still has not 
been decided neither on the ways of EU demos creating, nor on the prevailing social 
model, nor on the limits of the enlargement that could give this demos a more definite 
geographical “body”.
The EU Constitutional Treaty is absolutely necessary in order to consolidate all 
political forces to unanimously create the EU demos, the civic society, character-
ized by the civic transnational identity. Another important objective is to expand the 
European civic space, ensuring the participation of the citizens in solving both the 
European and the local problems, and, finally, to create the system of the European 
parties. Habermas has concretized his ideas in his well-known program statement 
“Unsere Erneuerung” (Derrida, Habermas 2003), which was also signed by Derrida. 
Both philosophers agree that it is extremely difficult to define the European identity, 
because many things which originated in Europe and testified Europeanness, such 
as Christianity, democracy, human rights, humanism and others, have already widely 
spread throughout the world, so they are no longer considered to be the peculiar fea-
tures of Europeanness. While the New Europe is created from national states, the 
vitality of the European identity can be sustained only by the realization of common 
political fate and a convincing vision of the future. The most promising expectation 
regarding the future is that in Europe which has experienced various dramatic con-
flicts there has been established the attitude to recognize and admit the difference 
of the Other. It is this attitude that should be considered as the key feature of the 
Europeanness, as well as the backbone of the creation of the new political and civic 
European identity. The new features of Europeanness include the intolerance to vio-
lence, a belief to solve all sorts of controversial problems on the grounds of solidarity 
as well as a critical attitude to the omnipotence of market economy. It is suggested 
that the European demos should be created through the normative formations of the 
civic values, which are supposed to replace the essentialist and essencializing fea-
tures of different identities as well as the features of the conceptions of the citizen-
ship that sustain the disjuncture from the “others”. These values should encompass 
the commitments to democracy, freedom, and the European social models, since they 
should become the background for developing the tolerance and respect for diversity 
and difference.
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It takes no effort to observe that in order to avoid the trap of the essentialism you 
can readily get into another pitfall. While the content of the pragmatic political defi-
nitions depends on the consensus of the political elites, the development of the civic 
society becomes exclusively the matter of the power of the political elites. Thus, the 
underlying and exemplary representative European democracy comes to be destroyed. 
Consequently, the “deficit” of democracy is not being reduced – still worse – it be-
comes an unsolvable and even non-solvable problem. On the other hand, nobody can 
tell whether the political attitude to “erase” the essentialism linked with the origin and 
the place of birth will not stimulate new manifestations of various kinds of national-
isms and certain made up or “revived” cultural and ethnic exclusiveness.
The experience of the 20th shows that national issues can turn into aggressive 
nationalism. However, on the other hand, as nationalism is historically related to the 
development of the democracy, it is only natural to speak about national democratic 
forms. Supplanting or marginalizing the expression of national issues, the abstract 
civic principles seem to hang in the air and lose contact with the diversity of ethnic 
or ethnic religious formations. Consequently, there is a threat that the ethnic cultural 
and religious communities could invoke those principles in order to consolidate their 
insularity as well as to reinforce their political power. Dominique Schnapper has pre-
cisely noted that some unsoundness (or even perversity) is typical of the construction 
of the European policy by trying to restrict the powers of the national states and by 
weakening the national political identity, at the same time developing the regional 
policy, that is strengthening the links with the regional authorities, which often seeks 
to snatch more powers from the state authorities and encourages the expression of the 
local “strong” ethnic and religious identities (Schnapper 2002: 8). At present the rise 
of regional nationalisms has already been making a great influence on the EU policy.
The attitude of the unconditional European openness to the Other and the pro-
gram of the civic Europeanness being inculcated intersects with the tendency of the 
conspicuous spreading of radical ideologies. This tendency is regarded not as the 
manifestations of the old nationalisms, but rather as a by-product of globalization or 
response to the process of globalization. Having discussed the peculiarities of this 
tendency, Mary Kaldor comments that at the moment different political ideologies 
such as market fundamentalism, global Islamism, Europeanism, cosmopolitism and, 
naturally, nationalism are fiercely competing with each other; all these phenomena be-
ing closely connected in the global world, thus from the point of view of cosmopolitan 
policy an attempt should be made not only to entrench the human rights all over the 
world, but also to develop the strategy of survival of different cultures in the process 
of globalization (Kaldor 2004: 174).
3
The construction and realization of the EU demos has become especially problem-
atic (maybe it will be otherwise?) after the recent enlargement of the EU. How is 
the attitude of denationalization conceived by the societies of new Member States or, 
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moreover, is it conceived at all? While considering this question, we will refer to the 
example of Lithuania. Special attention should be drawn to one specific aspect, which 
is actually evaded by the researchers of the post-communist societies, that is the fact 
that the societies and nations which have experienced the policy of Soviet denational-
ization alongside with the intense Russification have entered into the realm of the new 
kind of denationalization policy. Thus, first and foremost, it is important to highlight 
the peculiarities of the policy of Soviet denationalization.
Soviet denationalization was continuously and remarkably ingenuously implement-
ed by erasing, even burning out the Other of the past that embraced the existence of a 
formerly independent state (the “fascist regime of Antanas Smetona”, “the so-called 
independence”), the values of independence and statehood, and, particularly, the trag-
edy of the pre- and post-war transportations as well as the struggles of the post-war 
armed resistance. The Other of the past was characterized by an extremely danger-
ous for Soviet reality feature regarded as a lethal infection, namely, “the bourgeois 
nationalism”. That nationalism had to be supplanted by upbringing a new Soviet man, 
i.e. an internationalist. Like the postwar Germans could not imagine talking about 
their life during the years of the fascist dictatorship, the Lithuanians and the citizens 
of all occupied Soviet republics, similarly, could not dare to speak openly about the 
existence of the independent state, occupation, transportation and the post-war resist-
ance. The attitude of the extermination of “bourgeois nationalism” slightly resembles 
the attitude of the European denationalization since the Other possessing the features 
of nationalism is being erased and marginalized. Yet, it is that Other in whose regard 
the landmarks of the future policy are being established together with the program 
of the individual identity forming and self-training. Here we have in mind certain 
logic, which is defined by the very action of “erasure” or dissociation, rather than the 
similarity of the policy being implemented. The Soviet erasing of the Other was based 
upon the society’s fear stemming from the experience of the “gulag” system and other 
atrocities of Stalinism.
Lithuania’s liberation from the Soviet Union should be regarded as the manifesta-
tion of the national liberation movement, since the nation that has accumulated the 
statehood experience was escaping from the iron grip of the occupation. In spite of 
being erased from the public consciousness it was the surviving and still vital Other 
that was invoked to summon the Lithuanian society and the Lithuanian nation for the 
breakthrough of liberation. That Other included the experience of national statehood, 
the tragedy of transportation as well as the history of the armed postwar resistance, 
stimulated by the national feelings and national values. In other words, the national 
liberation was sustained by national feelings and by the rhetoric upraising of the na-
tional symbols and cultural forms. It was the feeling of the identification between the 
nation and the state as well as the statehood that mattered most of all. Such identifi-
cation is not an exceptional nationalist feature of the Lithuanians and other societies 
of some new Member States. It is also typical of other European nations, though it is 
not expressed so notably. Having reviewed the debates in Denmark on the European 
integration, Lene Hansen notices: “In the context of Danish debates on European 
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integration, the most important consequence has been a preoccupation with the na-
tion-state as the optimal model for embodying political identity, trust and authority” 
(Hansen 2003: 312). 
After Lithuania had regained its independence it soon became evident that for the 
Western observers and analysts who were nurtured in the environment of suspicion 
regarding nationalism, the rhetoric of the national liberation and revival seemed to 
be not quite acceptable, rather strange, and needing to be promptly changed. It were 
nationalist traditions that certain political thinkers had in mind when they exaggerat-
ingly warned against the future of post-Soviet states be shaped by the past (Habermas 
1994: 66). The Lithuanians came to be looked upon as the nation which is too much 
exalted, “far too” overestimating the significance of the national and religious symbols 
as well as its history. Thus, it can be stated that after the regaining of independence 
Lithuanian society became frustrated because of the uncertainty concerning national, 
civic, and cultural identity. This uncertainty is aggravated by ever widening gap be-
tween the political elite, decisions makers and the public interests. 
Our political elite has not considered publicly either the attitude of denationaliza-
tion, or the landmarks of creating the civic Europeanness, or the new problems raised 
by that policy. It seems that the post-Soviet elite was very quick to conceive the atti-
tude of the European denationalization and managed to adapt to it. How did it happen 
so?
In order to answer this question, we should find out what kind of political elite 
governed and is still governing Lithuania. In Lithuania, which has regained its inde-
pendence, the political and economical power has been retained by the communist 
nomenclature that has accumulated a very wide experience in the policy of Soviet 
denationalization, in the fight against the “bourgeois nationalism” as well as in the 
upbringing of the “new man”. Consequently, the local political elite did not have to 
change the basic attitude regarding the national question. All it had to do was to endue 
that attitude with a new kind of rhetoric. The former Lithuanian communist elite of 
nomenclature has retained the political and economical power and has adjusted to the 
EU political elite on the grounds of Euro-integration and its ideology. National issues 
were either marginalized or left for self-extinction. The questions of the national and 
cultural identity and the potential threats to it have become “old-fashioned”, inappro-
priate and have been pushed into the sphere of the manifestations of nationalism to be 
supplanted. Thus, it may be claimed that the Lithuanian society is experiencing a cer-
tain both national and civic identity crisis, which is being stimulated by an extremely 
large wave of emigration. This does not allow the society to properly conceive and 
assimilate civic European values.
Two main attitudes can be distinguished in regard to the EU development. Some 
hold that it is the incoherence of the policy of denationalization that causes most prob-
lems, so it just should be enhanced. We are inclined to support the other attitude, 
maintaining that it is necessary to look for the ways how to invoke the “glue” of na-
tional feelings and values which could reinforce the social and cultural cohesion in 
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the process of creating the EU demos. Of course, we should take into consideration 
the dangers of nationalism. In the words of José Manuel Barroso, the President of the 
European Commission, “it is simply wrong to think that a single market can be sus-
tained without social cohesion, a political vision and the solidarity that flows from the 
feeling of belonging to a common Project” (Barroso 2005). These words point to the 
problem of social content of integrational drives and the need of a more determinate 
European community and in their own way reassert the conclusions made some time 
ago by Michael Wilkinson: “Faced with the combination of the apparent intransigence 
of national democratic structures, and the increasing opposition to the development of 
market (re-)regulation without democratic legitimization, Europe is perhaps in need in 
developing new democratic governance and effective global management” (Wilkinson 
2002: 186). Thus national democratic forms and national feelings seems to be neces-
sary for any roads to new democratic European governance and European demos. The 
more so that the manifestations of a modern nationalism can be regarded not only as 
the response to the threats posed by globalization, but also to the too forthright policy 
of denationalization which is let down from “the top”.
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Gilinantis į Europos Są jungą (ES), kaip į pasaulinę civilizacijų sistemą keičian-
čio civilizacinio darinio integracinius procesus, aiškėja, kad ES ateitis priklau-
sys nuo to, koks požiūris į nacionalinius, etnokultūrinius bei politinius tapatu-
mus įsivyraus tarp šios bendrijos politikos formuotojų. Domėtis įvairiais tapatu-
mais paskatino ES Konstitucinės Sutarties nesėkmė, sukėlusi svarstymų bangą 
apie naują Europos „išradimą“ ar „pagrindimą“. Keltas esminis klausimas – kas 
yra Konstitucinės Sutarties subjektas ir kokie europietiškojo demos bruožai? 
Išryškėjo ES būdingos demokratijos, legitimumo ir visuomenės stokos, tad to-
lesnė integracija įsivaizduotina kaip jų šalinimo vyksmas. Klausimas – kaip 
šitai galima daryti vyraujant politinei denacionalizavimo nuostatai, kuri buvo 
įtvirtinta dedant naujos Europos pagrindus? Politinę denacionalizacijos nuostatą 
palaiko pastaraisiais metais išplitę postnacionalinio tapatumo, europinio kons-
titucinio patriotizmo, taip pat besąlygiško svetingumo diskursai. Legitimumo 
ir kitokių stokų bei europietiškojo demos problemos ypač suaktualėjo išsiplėtus 
ES. Priimtų valstybių visuomenėms ir tautoms būdinga kitokia istorinė patirtis, 
stipresni nacionaliniai jausmai, kurie ir padėjo išsivaduoti iš sovietinės okupa-
cijos. Į šias jausenas būtina atsižvelgti svarstant europietiškojo demos kūrimo 
planus. Socialinį europinės visuomenės turinį derėtų kaupti ir kurti ne atmetant 
nacionalines jausenas, o pasitelkiant prisirišimą prie tautos, kultūros, kalbos bei 
istorinių mitų, tad kyla būtinumas keisti politinę denacionalizavimo nuostatą.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: denacionalizacija, ES Konstitucinė Sutartis, europietiškasis 
demos, legitimumo stoka, nacionalinis tapatumas, nacionalizmas, sovietinė 
okupacija.
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